I-502, driving is a privilege not a right, and the facts with a dash of opinion.

Discussions concerning the 5ng/mL whole blood active THC limit typically involve one or more of the parties involved either directly stating that driving is a right or make assertions that equate driving to a right. Both the statements and the beliefs about the statement are false being that the facts counter these claims and beliefs, as you will see.


noun /ˈpriv(ə)lij/ 

privileges, plural

1.A special right, advantage, or immunity granted or available only to a particular person or group of people

– education is a right, not a privilege

– he has been accustomed all his life to wealth and privilege

Google Dictionary

RCW 46.20.001 License required — Rights and restriction.

(1) No person may drive a motor vehicle upon a highway in this state without first obtaining a valid driver’s license issued to Washington residents under this chapter. The only exceptions to this requirement are those expressly allowed by RCW 46.20.025.

(2) A person licensed as a driver under this chapter:

(a) May exercise the privilege upon all highways in this state;

(b) May not be required by a political subdivision to obtain any other license to exercise the privilege; and

(c) May not have more than one valid driver’s license at any time.

[1999 c 6 § 3.]

Revised Code of Washington 46.61.001 License Required – Rights and restriction.

Washington Driver Guide

Message From The Director

Welcome to driving in Washington. I am pleased to present the Washington Driver Guide for current and future drivers on Washington roads.

At the Department of Licensing, our mission is to work together for a safer Washington. One way we can accomplish this is through education and careful licensing of the nearly five million drivers sharing our streets and highways.

Driving is a vital part of life, yet owning a vehicle and holding a driver license are privileges that require responsibility. This manual provides a summary of the laws, rules, and techniques that apply to every person who drives a vehicle in Washington State.

Please remember to buckle up, obey speed laws, and never drive under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Respect for traffic laws and respect for other drivers will keep us all safe on the road.

For more information about our services, visit our website at http://www.dol.wa.gov.

Safe Driving

Alan Haight


Washington State’s Online Washington Driver Guide page 4

Freedom of movement under United States law

Mann Act

The U.S. Supreme Court also dealt with the right to travel in the case of Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999). In that case, Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the majority, held that the United States Constitution protected three separate aspects of the right to travel among the states: the right to enter one state and leave another, the right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than a hostile stranger (protected by the “privileges and immunities” clause in Article IV, § 2), and (for those who become permanent residents of a state) the right to be treated equally to native born citizens (this is protected by the 14th Amendment’s Citizenship Clause).


For much of American history, the right to travel included the right to travel by the vehicle of one’s choice, and courts occasionally struck down regional regulations that required licenses or government permission to travel on public roadways. With the advent of the automobile, however, courts began upholding laws and regulations requiring licenses to operate vehicles on roadways. Constitutional scholar Roger Roots has referred to the forgotten right to travel without license as “the orphaned right.”[19]

Wikipedia Article: Freedom of movement under United States law

My Opinion

Driving a motor vehicle on the highways and byways of America is a privilege, while consuming cannabis is a human right. Comparing the two as equals confounds the debate with a false, baseless premise that is not only erroneous but is also dangerous. It is dangerous in the following two ways; if someone who takes this falsehood as truth may attempt to enforce this right with officer of the law who will promptly explain it is not a right, which could lead further complications for the mistaken stoner for police do not like to be told what constitutes an individual’s ‘rights,’ it is also a lie and as I have mentioned before lying is the tactic of the drug warriors and we can see where that tactic got the citizens of the world.


About TriXteR Phillips

Founder and Jack-of-all-Trades at Stand Up and Speak Out a volunteer organization devoted to providing the public with safe, legal, and supportive events on 4-20 to help bring public attention to the need to end cannabis prohibition for all humanity. Founder, Admin, Blogger, and Jack-of-all-Trades at TriXteR Phillips: A Poison Thorn in Prohibition's Side.
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15 Responses to I-502, driving is a privilege not a right, and the facts with a dash of opinion.

  1. stmatthew says:

    ehh,… one more;

    and I add this one just because it is SOOO poetic and relevant HERE, as this was stated by a Washington State Supreme Court Justice on this very topic, in his dissent;

    If ever a judge understood the public’s right to use the public roads, it was Justice Tolman of the Supreme Court of the State of Washington. Justice Tolman stated:

    “Complete freedom of the highways is so old and well established a blessing that we have forgotten the days of the Robber Barons and toll roads, and yet, under an act like this, arbitrarily administered, the highways may be completely monopolized, if, through lack of interest, the people submit, then they may look to see the most sacred of their liberties taken from them one by one, by more or less rapid encroachment.”
    Robertson vs. Department of Public Works, 180 Wash 133, 147.


    UNALIENABLE. The state of a thing or right which cannot be sold.

    2. Things which are not in commerce, as public roads, are in their nature unalienable. Some things are unalienable, in consequence of particular provisions in the law forbidding their sale or transfer, as pensions granted by the government. The natural rights of life and liberty are UNALIENABLE. Bouviers Law Dictionary 1856 Edition

    “Unalienable: incapable of being alienated, that is, sold and transferred.” Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, page 1523:

    You can not surrender, sell or transfer unalienable rights, they are a gift from the creator to the individual and can not under any circumstances be surrendered or taken. All individual’s have unalienable rights.

    Inalienable rights: Rights which are not capable of being surrendered or transferred without the consent of the one possessing such rights. Morrison v. State, Mo. App., 252 S.W.2d 97, 101.

    You can surrender, sell or transfer inalienable rights if you consent either actually or constructively. Inalienable rights are not inherent in man and can be alienated by government. Persons have inalienable rights. Most state constitutions recognize only inalienable rights.

    We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. That whenever any form of government becomes destructive to these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

    Men are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights,-‘life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness;’ and to ‘secure,’ not grant or create, these rights, governments are instituted. That property which a man has honestly acquired he retains full control of, subject to these limitations: First, that he shall not use it to his neighbor’s injury, and that does not mean that he must use it for his neighbor’s benefit; second, that if the devotes it to a public use, he gives to the public a right to control that use; and third, that whenever the public needs require, the public may take it upon payment of due compensation. BUDD v. PEOPLE OF STATE OF NEW YORK, 143 U.S. 517 (1892)

    Among these unalienable rights, as proclaimed in that great document, is the right of men to pursue their happiness, by which is meant the right to pursue any lawful business or vocation, in any manner not inconsistent with the equal rights of others, which may increase their prosperity or develop their faculties, so as to give to them their highest enjoyment. The common business and callings of life, the ordinary trades and pursuits, which are innocuous in themselves, and have been followed in all communities from time immemorial, must therefore be free in this country to all alike upon the same conditions. The right to pursue them, without let or hinderance, except that which is applied to all persons of the same age, sex, and condition, is a distinguishing privilege of citizens of the United States, and an essential element of that freedom which they claim as their birthright. It has been well said that ‘THE PROPERTY WHICH EVERY MAN HAS IN HIS OWN LABOR, AS IT IS THE ORIGINAL FOUNDATION OF ALL OTHER PROPERTY, SO IT IS THE MOST SACRED AND INVIOLABLE. The patrimony of the poor man lies in the strength and dexterity of his own hands, and to hinder his employing this strength and dexterity in what manner he thinks proper, without injury to his neighbor, is a plain violation of this most sacred property. It is a manifest encroachment upon the just liberty both of the workman and of those who might be disposed to employ him. . . The right to follow any of the common occupations of life is an inalienable right, it was formulated as such under the phrase ‘pursuit of happiness’ in the declaration of independence, which commenced with the fundamental proposition that ‘all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.’ This right is a large ingredient in the civil liberty of the citizen. To deny it to all but a few favored individuals, by investing the latter with a monopoly, is to invade one of the fundamental privileges of the citizen, contrary not only to common right, but, as I think, to the express words of the constitution. It is what no legislature has a right to do; and no contract to that end can be binding on subsequent legislatures. . . BUTCHERS’ UNION CO. v. CRESCENT CITY CO., 111 U.S. 746 (1884)

    “Burlamaqui (Politic c. #, . 15) defines natural liberty as “the right which nature gives to all mankind of disposing of their persons and property after the manner they may judge most consonant to their happiness, on condition of their acting within the limits of the law of nature, and so as not to interfere with an equal exercise of the same rights by other men;” and therefore it has been justly said, that “absolute rights of individuals may be resolved into the right of personal security–the right of personal liberty–and the right to acquire and enjoy property. These rights have been justly considered and frequently declared by the people of this country to be natural, inherent, and unalienable.” Potter’s Dwarris, ch. 13, p. 429.

    From these passages it is evident; that the right of acquiring and possessing property, and having it protected, is one of the natural, inherent, and unalienable rights of man. Men have a sense of property: Property is necessary to their subsistence, and correspondent to their natural wants and desires; its security was one of the objects, that induced them to unite in society. No man would become a member of a community, in which he could not enjoy the fruits of his honest labour and industry. . . The constitution expressly declares, that the right of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property is natural, inherent, and unalienable. It is a right not ex gratia from the legislature, but ex debito from the constitution. . . Where is the security, where the inviolability of property, if the legislature, by a private act, affecting particular persons ONLY, can take land from one citizen, who acquired it legally, and vest it in another? VANHORNE’S LESSEE v. DORRANCE, 2 U.S. 304 (1795)

    (“[T]he Due Process Clause protects [the unalienable liberty recognized in the Declaration of Independence] rather than the particular rights or privileges conferred by specific laws or regulations.” SANDIN v. CONNER, ___ U.S. ___ (1995)

    In the second article of the Declaration of Rights, which was made part of the late Constitution of Pennsylvania, it is declared: ‘That all men have a natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty God, according to the dictates of their own consciences and understanding; and that no man ought or of right can be compelled, to attend any religious worship, or erect or support any place of worship, or maintain any ministry, contrary to, or against, his own free will and consent; nor can any man, who acknowledges the being of a God, be justly deprived or abridged of any civil right as a citizen, on account of his religious sentiments, or peculiar mode of religious worship; and that no authority can, or ought to be, vested in, or assumed, by any power whatever, that shall, in any case, interfere with, or in any manner controul, the right of conscience in the free exercise of religious worship.’ (Dec. of Rights, Art. 2.). . . (The Judge then read the 1st. 8th. and 11th articles of the Declaration of Rights; and the 9th. and 46th sections of the Constitution of Pennsylvania. See 1 Vol. Dall. Edit. Penn. Laws p. 55. 6. 60. in the Appendix.) From these passages it is evident; that the right of acquiring and possessing property, and having it protected, is one of the natural, inherent, and unalienable rights of man. Men have a sense of property: Property is necessary to their subsistence, and correspondent to their natural wants and desires; its security was one of the objects, that induced them to unite in society. No man would become a member of a community, in which he could not enjoy the fruits of his honest labour and industry. The preservation of property then is a primary object of the social compact, and, by the late Constitution of Pennsylvania, was made a fundamental law. . . The constitution expressly declares, that the right of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property is natural, inherent, and unalienable. It is a right not ex gratia from the legislature, but ex debito from the constitution. VANHORNE’S LESSEE v. DORRANCE, 2 U.S. 304 (1795)

    I had thought it self-evident that all men were endowed by their Creator with liberty as one of the cardinal unalienable rights. It is that basic freedom which the Due Process Clause protects, rather than the particular rights or privileges conferred by specific laws or regulations. . . It demeans the holding in Morrissey – more importantly it demeans the concept of liberty itself – to ascribe to that holding nothing more than a protection of an interest that the State has created through its own prison regulations. For if the inmate’s protected liberty interests are no greater than the State chooses to allow, he is really little more than the slave described in the 19th century cases. I think it clear that even the inmate retains an unalienable interest in liberty – at the very minimum the right to be treated with dignity – which the Constitution may never ignore. MEACHUM v. FANO, 427 U.S. 215 (1976)

    All commissions (regardless of their form, or by whom issued) contain, impliedly, the constitutional reservation, that the people at any time have the right, through their representatives, to alter, reform, or abolish the office, as they may alter, if they choose, the whole form of government. In our magna charta it is proclaimed (2d section of the Bill of Rights, under the 9th Article of the Constitution of Pennsylvania), that ‘all power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded on their authority, and instituted for their peace, safety, and happiness; for the advancement of these ends they have at all times an unalienable and indefeasible right to alter, reform, or abolish their government, in such manner as they may think proper.’ It has been well said, by one of the ablest judges of the age, that ‘a constitution is not to receive a technical construction, like a common law instrument or a statute. It is to be interpreted so as to carry out the great principles of the government, not to defeat them.’ Per Gibson, C. J., in Commonwealth v. Clark, 7 Watts & S. (Pa.), 133. BUTLER v. COM. OF PENNSYLVANIA, 51 U.S. 402 (1850)

    The rights of life and personal liberty are natural rights of man. ‘To secure these rights,’ says the Declaration of Independence, ‘governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.’ The very highest duty of the States, when they entered into the Union under the Constitution, was to protect all persons within their boundaries in the enjoyment of these ‘unalienable rights with which they were endowed by their Creator.’ Sovereignty, for this purpose, rests alone with the States. It is no more the duty or within the power of the United States to punish for a conspiracy to falsely imprison or murder within a State, than it would be to punish for false imprisonment or murder itself. U S v. CRUIKSHANK, 92 U.S. 542 (1875)

    “. . . The question presented is not whether the United States has the power to condemn and appropriate this property of the Monongahela Company, for that is conceded, but how much it must pay as compensation therefor. Obviously, this question, as all others which run along the line of the extent of the protection the individual has under the Constitution against the demands of the government, is of importance; for in any society the fulness and sufficiency of the securities which surround the individual in the use and enjoyment of his property constitute one of the most certain tests of the character and value of the government. The first ten amendments to the Constitution, adopted as they were soon after the adoption of the Constitution, are in the nature of a bill of rights, and were adopted in order to quiet the apprehension of many, that without some such declaration of rights the government would assume, and might be held to possess, the power to trespass upon those rights of persons and property which by the Declaration of Independence were affirmed to be unalienable rights. UNITED STATES v. TWIN CITY POWER CO., 350 U.S. 222 (1956)

    ‘By the common law, the king as parens patriae owned the soil under all the waters of all navigable rivers or arms of the sea where the tide regularly ebbs and flows, including the shore or bank to high- water mark. … He held these rights, not for his own benefit, but for the benefit of his subjects at large, who were entitled to the free use of the sea, and all tide waters, for the purposes of navigation, fishing, etc., subject to such regulations and restrictions as the crown or the Parliament might prescribe. By Magna Charta, and many subsequent statutes, the powers of the king are limited, and he cannot now deprive his subjects of these rights by granting the public navigable waters to individuals. But there can be no doubt of the right of Parliament in England, or the Legislature of this state, to make such grants, when they do not interfere with the vested rights of particular individuals. The right to navigate the public waters of the state and to fish therein, and the right to use the public highways, are all public rights belonging to the people at large. They are not the private unalienable rights of each individual. Hence the Legislature as the representatives of the public may restrict and regulate the exercise of those rights in such manner as may be deemed most beneficial to the public at large: Provided they do not interfere with vested rights which have been granted to individuals.’ APPLEBY v. CITY OF NEW YORK, 271 U.S. 364 (1926)

    I Elliot’s Debates on the Federal Constitution (1876) 319 et seq. In ratifying the Constitution the following

    declarations were made: New Hampshire, p. 326, ‘XI. Congress shall make no laws touching religion, or to infringe the rights of conscience.’ Virginia, p. 327, ‘… no right, of any denomination, can be cancelled, abridged, restrained, or modified, by the Congress, by the Senate or House of Representatives, acting in any capacity, by the President, or any department or officer of the United States, except in those instances in which power is given by the Constitution for those purposes; and that among other essential rights, the liberty of conscience, and of the press, cannot be cancelled, abridged, restrained, or modified, by any authority of the United States.’ New York, p. 328, ‘That the freedom of the press ought not to be violated or restrained.’ After the submission of the amendments, Rhode Island ratified and declared, pp. 334, 335, ‘IV. That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, and not by force and violence; and therefore all men have a natural, equal, and unalienable right to the exercise of religion according to the dictates of conscience; and that no particular religious sect or society ought to be favored or established, by law, in preference to others. … XVI. That the people have a right to freedom of speech, and of writing and publishing their sentiments. That freedom of the press is one of the greatest bulwarks of liberty, and ought not to be violated.’ JONES v. CITY OF OPELIKA, 319 U.S. 105 (1943)

    As to the objections made on the other side to our interpretation of the compact, that it impugns the right to the pursuit of happiness, which is inherent in every society of men, and is incompatible with these unalienable rights of sovereignty and of self-government, which every independent State must possess, the answer is obvious: that no people has a right to pursue its own happiness to the injury of others, for whose protection solemn compacts, like the present, have been made. It is a trite maxim, that man gives up a part of his natural liberty when he enters into civil society, as the price of the blessings of that state: and it may be said, with truth, this liberty is well exchanged for the advantages which flow from law and justice. GREEN v. BIDDLE, 21 U.S. 1 (1821)

    This court said, in the case of The Bank of Columbia v. Okely (4 Wheat. 235), in speaking of a summary proceeding given by the charter of that bank for the collection of its debts: ‘It is the remedy, and not the right, and as such we have no doubt of its being subject to the will of Congress. The forms of administering justice, and the duties and powers of courts as incident to the exercise of a branch of sovereign power, must ever be subject to legislative will, and the power over them is unalienable, so as to bind subsequent legislatures.’ And in Young v. The Bank of Alexandria (4 Cranch, 397), Mr. Chief Justice Marshall says: ‘There is a difference between those rights on which the validity of the transactions of the corporation depends, which must adhere to those transactions everywhere, and those peculiar remedies which may be bestowed on it. The first are of general obligation; the last, from their nature, can only be exercised in those courts which the power making the grant can regulate.’ See also The Commonwealth v. The Delaware & Hudson Canal Co. et al., 43 Pa. St. 227; State of Maryland v. Northern Central Railroad Co., 18 Md. 193; Colby v. Dennis, 36 Me. 1; Gowan v. Penobscot Railroad Co., 44 id. 140. U.S. v. UNION PAC. R. CO., 98 U.S. 569 (1878)

    It is significant that the guarantee of freedom of speech and press falls between the religious guarantees and the guarantee of the right to petition for redress of grievances in the text of the First Amendment, the principles of which are carried to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. It partakes of the nature of both, for it is as much a guarantee to individuals of their personal right to make their thoughts public and put them before the community, see Holt, Of the Liberty of the Press, in Nelson, Freedom of the Press from Hamilton to the Warren Court 18-19, as it is a social necessity required for the “maintenance of our political system and an open society.” Time, Inc. v. Hill, supra, at 389. It is because of the personal nature

    of this right that we have rejected all manner of prior restraint on publication, Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, despite strong arguments that if the material was unprotected the time of suppression was immaterial. Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Personality, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 640. The dissemination of the individual’s opinions on matters of public interest is for us, in the historic words of the Declaration of Independence, an “unalienable right” that “governments are instituted among men to secure.” History shows us that the Founders were not always convinced that unlimited discussion of public issues would be “for the benefit of all of us”13 but that they firmly adhered to the proposition that the “true liberty of the press” permitted “every man to publish his opinion.” Respublica v. Oswald, 1 Dall. 319, 325 (Pa.). CURTIS PUBLISHING CO. v. BUTTS, 388 U.S. 130 (1967)

    While the “meaning and scope of the First Amendment” must be read “in light of its history and the evils it was designed forever to suppress,” Everson v. Board of Education, supra, at 14-15, this Court has also recognized that “this Nation’s history has not been one of entirely sanitized separation between Church and State.” Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, supra, at 760. “The fact that the Founding Fathers believed devotedly that there was a God and that the unalienable rights of man were rooted in Him is clearly evidenced in their writings, from the Mayflower Compact to the Constitution itself.” Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 213 (1963).5 The Court properly has noted “an unbroken history of official acknowledgment . . . of the role of religion in American life.” Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S., at 674, and has recognized that these references to “our religious heritage” are constitutionally acceptable. Id., at 677. EDWARDS v. AGUILLARD, 482 U.S. 578 (1987)

    When the First Congress was debating the Bill of Rights, it was contended that there was no need separately to assert the right of assembly because it was subsumed in freedom of speech. Mr. Sedgwick of Massachusetts argued that inclusion of “assembly” among the enumerated rights would tend to make the Congress “appear trifling in the eyes of their constituents. . . .” If people freely converse together, they must assemble for that purpose; it is a self-evident, unalienable right which the people possess; it is certainly a thing that never would be called in question . . . .” 1 Annals of Cong. 731 (1789). Since the right existed independent of any written guarantee, Sedgwick went on to argue that if it were the drafting committee’s purpose to protect all inherent rights of the people by listing them, “they might have gone into a very lengthy enumeration of rights,” but this was unnecessary, he said, “in a Government where none of them were intended to be infringed.” Id., at 732. Mr. Page of Virginia responded, however, that at times “such rights have been opposed,” and that “people have . . . been prevented from assembling together on their lawful occasions”: “[T]herefore it is well to guard against such stretches of authority, by inserting the privilege in the declaration of rights. If the people could be deprived of the power of assembling under any pretext whatsoever, they might be deprived of every other privilege contained in the clause.” Ibid. The motion to strike “assembly” was defeated. Id., at 733. RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS, INC. v. VIRGINIA, 448 U.S. 555 (1980)

    “Gentlemen, I have insisted, at great length, upon the origin of governments, and detailed the authorities which you have heard upon the subject, because I consider it to be not only an essential support, but the very foundation of the liberty of the press. If Mr. Burke be right in his principles of government, I admit that the press, in my sense of its freedom, ought not to be free, nor free in any sense at all; and that all addresses to the people upon the subjects of government, and all speculations of amendment, of what kind or nature soever, are illegal and criminal; since if the people have, with out possible re-call, delegated all their authorities, they have no jurisdiction to act, and therefore none to think or write upon such subjects; and it would be a libel to arraign government or any of its acts, before those who have no jurisdiction to correct them. But on the other hand . . . no legal argument can shake the freedom of the press in my sense of it, if I am supported in my doctrines concerning the great unalienable right of the people, to reform or to change their governments. It is because the liberty of the press resolves itself into this great issue, that it has been in every country the last liberty which subjects have been able to wrest from power. Other liberties are held under governments, but the liberty of opinion keeps governments themselves in due subjection to their duties.” 1 Speeches of Lord Erskine 524-525 (J. High ed. 1876). HERBERT v. LANDO, 441 U.S. 153 (1979)

    The denial of human rights was etched into the American Colonies’ first attempts at establishing self-government. When the colonists determined to seek their independence from England, they drafted a unique document cataloguing their grievances against the King and proclaiming as “self-evident” that “all men are created equal” and are endowed “with certain unalienable Rights,” including those to “Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.” The self-evident truths and the unalienable rights were intended, however, to apply only to white men. An earlier draft of the Declaration of Independence, submitted by Thomas Jefferson to the Continental Congress, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA REGENTS v. BAKKE, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)

    The Declaration of Independence states the American creed: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.” This ideal was not fully achieved with the adoption of our Constitution because of the hard and tragic reality of Negro slavery. The Constitution of the new Nation, while heralding liberty, in effect declared all men to be free and equal – except black men who were to be neither free nor equal. This inconsistency reflected a fundamental departure from the American creed, a departure which it took a tragic civil war to set right. With the adoption, however, of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution, freedom and equality were guaranteed expressly to all regardless “of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”1 United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 218. BELL v. MARYLAND, 378 U.S. 226 (1964)

  2. stmatthew says:


    THE STATE Courts can be sued in a Federal District Court for violations of “the Constitution of the United States” (typically in instances regarding your RIGHT TO TRAVEL, the 5th 13th and 14th amendments are initially violated “for a want of” and to UNLAWFULLY gain JURISDICTION by way of fear and intimidation, also ignorance, your “Acquiescence” to their CONTRACT/S) and violations of usurptation of “Rights” by Legislation; this can be done by filing a TORT Claim with the State office of risk management, typically within six months of the original Action/s against an individual, or, as many HIGHER COURTS have ruled concurrently, that it can also be done under the Doctrine of the “LAW OF VOIDS” wherein, ANY ACT OF FRAUD can be heard in collateral or direct attack, by any court, at any time.

    HInt: look up (Fed civ. Rules 12 (b) & 60 (b) (2)(3)(4))
    Hint 2: A fair majority of the following case law is applicable to FAR MORE than just “Driving” issues…

    “[Unalienable rights] are enumerated rights that individuals, acting in their own behalf, cannot disregard or destroy.” McCullough v. Brown, 19 S. E. 458, 480, 23 L.R.A. 410. Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides; “A judgment may not be rendered in violation of constitutional protections. “The validity of a judgment may be affected by a failure to give the constitutionally required due process notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Earle v. McVeigh, 91 US 503, 23 L Ed 398. See also Restatements, Judgments ‘ 4(b). Prather v Loyd, 86 Idaho 45, 382 P2d 910. requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.”); S.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Holden, 319 S.C. 72, 78, 459 S.E.2d 846, 849 (1995)

    “If a court grants relief, which under the circumstances it hasn’t any authority to grant, its judgment is to that extent void.” (1 Freeman on Judgments, 120c.) “A void judgment is no judgment at all and is without legal effect.” (Jordon v. Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701, 710 (6th Cir. 1974) “a court must vacate any judgment entered in excess of its jurisdiction.” (Lubben v. Selective Service System Local Bd. No. 27, 453 F.2d 645 (1st Cir. 1972).

    “Right of protecting property, declared inalienable by constitution, is not mere right to protect it by individual force, but right to protect it by law of land, and force of body politic.”Billings v. Hall (1857), 7 C. 1. (“The fundamental

    “To say that one may not defend his own property is usurpation of power by legislature.” O’Connell v. Judnich (1925), 71 C.A.386, 235 P. 664.

    28 U.S. Code § 1343 – Civil rights and elective franchise
    Current through Pub. L. 113-121. (See Public Laws for the current Congress.)
    (a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person:
    (1) To recover damages for injury to his person or property, or because of the deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, by any act done in furtherance of any conspiracy mentioned in section 1985 of Title 42;
    (2) To recover damages from any person who fails to prevent or to aid in preventing any wrongs mentioned in section 1985 of Title 42 which he had knowledge were about to occur and power to prevent;
    (3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States;
    (4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote.
    (b) For purposes of this section—
    (1) the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a State; and
    (2) any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.

    Fraud consists; of some deceitful practice or willful device, resorted to with intent to deprive another of his right, or in some manner to do him an injury. As distinguished from negligence, it is always positive, intentional. Maher v. Hibernia Ins. Co.,67 N. Y. 292; Alexander v. Church, 53 Conn. 501, 4 Atl. 103; Studer v. Bleistein. 115 N.Y. 31G, 22 X. E. 243, 7 L. R. A. 702; Moore v. Crawford, 130 U. S. 122, 9 Sup. Ct. 447,32 L. Ed. 878; Fechheimer v. Baum (C. C.) 37 Fed. 167; U. S. v. Beach (D. C.) 71 Fed.160; Gardner v. Ileartt, 3 Denio (N. Y.) 232; Monroe Mercantile Co. v. Arnold, 108 Ga. 449, 34 S. E. 176. Fraud, as applied to contracts, is the cause of an error bearing on a material part of the contract, created or continued by artifice, with design to obtain some unjust advantage to the one party, or to cause an inconvenience or loss to the other. Civil Code La. art. 1S47.Fraud, In the sense of a court of equity, properly Includes all acts, omissions, and concealments which involve a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence justly reposed, and are injurious to another, or by which an undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of another. 1 Story, Eq. Jur.

    Constructive fraud: Under contract law, a defendant can be liable to a plaintiff for constructive fraud if there was: (1) a false misrepresentation; (2) in reference to a material fact; (3) for the purpose of inducing the other party to rely on such representation; 4) on which the other party did justifiably rely; (5) which resulted in damages or injury; and (6) a fiduciary relationship between the parties. Hagarty v. Ithaca City School District, 423 N.Y.S. 2d 843 (1979).

    42 U.S. Code § 1985 (2)- Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights § 646.639¹ Unlawful collection practices:
    (1) As used in subsection (2) of this section:
    (K)Attempt to or threaten to enforce a right or remedy with knowledge or reason to know that the right or remedy does not exist, or threaten to take any action which the debt collector in the regular course of business does not take.
    (L) Use any form of communication which simulates legal or judicial process or which gives the appearance of being authorized, issued or approved by a governmental agency, governmental official or an attorney at law when it is not in fact so approved or authorized. (2) Obstructing justice; intimidating party, witness, or juror. If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to deter, by force, intimidation, or threat, any party or witness in any court of the United States from attending such court, or from testifying to any matter pending therein, freely, fully, and truthfully, or to injure such party or witness in his person or property on account of his having so attended or testified, or to influence the verdict, presentment, or indictment of any grand or petit juror in any such court, or to injure such juror in his person or property on account of any verdict, presentment, or indictment lawfully assented to by him, or of his being or having been such juror; or if two or more persons conspire for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating, in any manner, the due course of justice in any State or Territory, with intent to deny to any citizen the equal protection of the laws, or to injure him or his property for lawfully enforcing, or attempting to enforce, the right of any person, or class of persons, to the equal protection of the laws;
    (3) Depriving persons of rights or privileges If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws; or if two or more persons conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his support or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the election of any lawfully qualified person as an elector for President or Vice President, or as a Member of Congress of the United States; or to injure any citizen in person or property on account of such support or advocacy; in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.
    18.040 [Repealed by 1981 c.898 §53]
    18.042 Judgment in civil action that includes money award.
    (1) The judgment document for a judgment in a civil action that includes a money award must contain a separate section clearly labeled as a money award. Any judgment in a civil action that includes a money award, but does not contain a separate section clearly labeled as a money award, does not create a judgment lien but may be enforced by any other judgment remedy.
    (2) The separate section required by subsection (1) of this section must include all of the following:
    (a) The name and address of each judgment creditor and the name, address and telephone number of any attorney who represents one or more of the judgment creditors.
    (b) The name of each judgment debtor and, to the extent known by the judgment creditor:
    (A) The address of each judgment debtor;
    (B) The year of birth of each judgment debtor;
    (C) The tax identification number of each judgment debtor, or the final four digits of the Social Security number of each judgment debtor;
    (D) The final four digits of the driver license number of each judgment debtor and the name of the state that issued the license; and
    (E) The name of any attorney for each judgment debtor.
    (c) The name of any person or public body, as defined in ORS 174.109, other than the judgment creditor’s attorney, that is known by the judgment creditor to be entitled to any portion of the money award.
    (d) The amount of money awarded in the judgment, exclusive of amounts required to be included in the separate section under paragraphs (e) to (h) of this subsection.
    (e) Any interest owed as of the date the judgment is entered in the register, either as a specific amount or as accrual information, including the rate or rates of interest, the balance or balances upon which interest accrues, the date or dates from which interest at each rate on each balance runs, and whether interest is simple or compounded and, if compounded, at what intervals.
    (f) Information about interest that accrues on the judgment after entry in the register, including the rate or rates of interest, the balance or balances upon which interest accrues, the date or dates from which interest at each rate on each balance runs, and whether interest is simple or compounded and, if compounded, at what intervals.
    (g) For monetary obligations that are payable on a periodic basis, any accrued arrearages, required further payments per period and payment dates.
    (h) If the judgment requires the payment of costs and disbursements or attorney fees, a statement indicating that the award is made, any specific amounts awarded, a clear identification of the specific requests for relief for which any attorney fees are awarded and the amount of attorney fees awarded for each request for relief.
    (3) The information required by subsection (2) of this section must be set forth in the money award section of the judgment document in the same order as the requirements appear in subsection (2) of this section.
    (4) The separate section required by subsection (1) of this section must be placed immediately above the judge’s or court administrator’s signature. The separate section must be clearly labeled at its beginning as a money award. If the judgment includes a support award, the label of the separate section must so indicate. Except for information described in ORS 24.290, the separate section of the judgment document may not contain any provision except the information required by this section.
    (5) The provisions of this section do not apply to foreign judgments that are filed with a court under ORS 24.115 or 110.405. If a foreign judgment is filed with the court under ORS 24.115, the separate statement required by ORS 24.125 must be filed with the foreign judgment. [2003 c.576 §5; 2005 c.568 §12; 2007 c.339 §1; 2009 c.230 §1] FDIC Law, Regulations, Related Acts
    [15 USC 1692j] § 812. (a)(b) Furnishing certain deceptive forms
    (a) It is unlawful to design, compile, and furnish any form knowing that such form would be used to create the false belief in a consumer that a person other than the creditor of such consumer is participating in the collection of or in an attempt to collect a debt such consumer allegedly owes such creditor, when in fact such person is not so participating.
    (b) Any person who violates this section shall be liable to the same extent and in the same manner as a debt collector is liable under section 813 for failure to comply with a provision of this title.

    “There is no common law judicial immunity.” Pulliam v. Allen,
    104S.Ct. 1970; cited in Lezama v. Justice Court, A025829.

    Fraud. An intentional perversion of truth for the purpose of inducing another in reliance upon it to part with some valuable thing belonging to him or to surrender a legal right. A false representation of a matter of fact… which deceives and is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury. … It consists of some deceitful practice or willful device, resorted to with intent to.

    15 U.S. Code § 1681q – Obtaining information under false pretenses
    Current through Pub. L. 113-121. (See Public Laws for the current Congress.)
    Authorities (CFR) Any person who knowingly and willfully obtains information on a consumer from a under false pretenses shall be fined under title 18, imprisoned for not more than 2 years, or both.

    Board of County Commissioners of Quay County v. Wasson, 37 N.M. 503, 24 P.2d 1098; Fullen v. Fullen, 21 N.M. 212, 153 P. 294; Baca v. Perea, 25 N.M. 442, 184 P. 482; De Baca v. Wilcox, 11 N.M. 346, 68 P. 922. In the case of Upjohn Co. v. Board of Commissioners of Socorro County (Stephenson, Intervener) 25 N.M. 526, 185 P. 279, 280, we held a judgment against a garnishee void where service of the writ of garnishment was made by a person other than the sheriff, where we said: “The proceeding is wholly statutory, and compliance with the statute is essential to confer upon the court jurisdiction of the res.” And held that the court was vested with power to set aside and vacate such void judgment at any time. A void judgment is one that has merely semblance, without some essential element or elements, as where the court purporting to render it has not jurisdiction. An irregular judgment is one entered contrary to the course of the court, contrary to the method of procedure and practice under it allowed by law in some material respect, as if the court gave judgment without the intervention of a jury in a case where the party complaining was entitled to a jury trial, and did not waive his right to the same. Vass v. Building Association, 91 N. C. 55; McKee v. Angel, 90 N. C. 60. An erroneous judgment is one rendered contrary to law. The latter cannot be attacked collaterally at all, but it must remain and have effect until by appeal to a court of errors it shall be reversed or modified. An irregular judgment may originally and generally be set aside by a motion for the purpose in the action. This is so because in such case a judgment was entered contrary to the course of the court by inadvertence, mistake, or the like. A void judgment is without life or force, and the court will quash it on motion, or ex mero motu. Indeed, when it appears to be void it may and will be ignored everywhere, and treated as a mere nullity.” Moore v. Packer, 174 N. C. 665, 94 S. E. 449, at page 450. [T]he applicable ground [for relief] would be Rule 60(B)(4), void judgment.”

    In Burt & Gordon v. Stein, 128 Or App 350, 354, 867 P2d 338, rev den 320 Or 270 (1994), “we held that it was an abuse of discretion for a trial court to refuse to set aside a void judgment. In doing so, we quoted Black’s Law Dictionary 1412 (5th ed 1979), which defined a void judgment as'”[o]ne which has no legal force or effect, [the] invalidity of which may be asserted by any person whose rights are affected at any time and at any place or collaterally. One which, from its inception is and forever continues to be absolutely null, without legal efficacy, ineffectual to bind parties or support a right, of no legal force and effect whatever, and incapable of confirmation, ratification, or enforcement in any manner or to any degree. One that has merely semblance without some essential elements, as want of jurisdiction or failure to serve process or have party in court.’ (Citation omitted.)”‘128 Or App at 354-55. Because a void judgment, as the definition indicates, is a nullity ab initio, all that a trial court does when it sets it aside is to give effect to its prior determination of its nullity. It does not exercise any discretion, and there cannot be any time limitations on its action.”

    “As both the Supreme Court and this court have recognized, the source of ORCP 71 is FRCP 60. Both courts have also relied on federal cases in construing other portions of the rule. See McCathern v. Toyota Motor Corp., 332 Or 59, 23 P3d 320 (2001); Johnson v. Johnson, 302 Or 382, 391-92, 730 P2d 1221 (1986); Jansen v. Atiyeh, 96 Or App 54, 59-60, 771 P2d 298 (1989). A leading treatise describes the law under FRCP 60(b)(4), which is essentially identical to ORCP 71 B(1)(d):”Rule 60(b)(4) authorizes relief from void judgments. Necessarily a motion under this part of the rule differs markedly from motions under the other clauses of Rule 60(b). There is no question of discretion on the part of the court when a motion is under Rule 60(b)(4), nor is there any requirement, as there usually is when default judgments are attacked under Rule 60(b), that the moving party show that he has a meritorious defense. Either a judgment is void or it is valid. Determining which it is may well present a difficult question, but when that question is resolved, the court must act accordingly. Art. III, § 2 of the U.S. Constitution, of course, extends the judicial power of the United States to “all Cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.” From the 1789 Judiciary Act to the present-day 28 USC § 1333, Congress has given federal and state courts concurrent jurisdiction over such cases, with a few exceptions, through the famous “saving to suitors” clause of the federal court admiralty jurisdiction statute. 28 USC § 1333 provides that federal district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over admiralty cases “saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.” Jury trial is not available in a case filed under 28 USC § 1333 on the admiralty side of the U.S. District Court. A plaintiff in an admiralty case can obtain a jury trial, however, by filing it in state court. The federal removal statute, 28 USC § 1441, provides in effect that a case can be removed from state court to federal court if the case could have been brought under the U.S. District Court’s original jurisdiction. State court cases are often removed by defendants to federal court if grounds exist for the case to have been originally filed under the federal court’s diversity jurisdiction (28 USC § 1332) or its federal question jurisdiction (28 USC §1331). In Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 US 354, 3 L.Ed.2d 368, 79 S.Ct. 468 (1959), the Supreme Court held that admiralty cases are not federal question cases for purposes of removal under § 1441. The court also stated that § 1441 does not permit removal of a state court case to the admiralty side of a federal court. The principal reasoning for the latter point was that to construe § 1441 otherwise would permit a defendant to deprive a plaintiff of the right under the saving to suitors clause of 28 USC § 1333 to choose a forum for filing an admiralty case which included the right of jury trial. As so construed, § 1441 permits an admiralty case to be removed to federal court by an out-of-state defendant only if there is diversity of citizenship between all plaintiffs and all defendants and the amount of controversy 1 Carl R. Neil is a partner at Lindsay, Hart, Neil & Weigler, LLP in Portland, Oregon, and specializes in maritime law. He also teaches that subject as an adjunct professor at Northwestern School of Law of Lewis & Clark College. He acknowledges reliance for this article on David J. Sharpe, “Uncontested Removal to Admiralty,” 5 Benedict’s Law Bulletin 172 (2007). age 2 of 3 {00128135.DOC; 1}exceeds $75,000 (28 USC§ 1332) or if the case arises under a federal question other than admiralty law (28 USC § 1331). Removal under diversity or federal question jurisdiction does not deprive the plaintiff of the right of jury trial, since that right also exists under those branches of federal court jurisdiction.”

    “Party cannot be bound by contract that he has not made or authorized.” Alexander v. Bosworth (1915), 26 C.A. 589, 599, 147 P.607. “The intention of one party does not make contract.” Barrios & Co. v. Pettigrew (G. V.) Co. (1924), 68 C.A. 139, 228 P. 676.
    A citizen’s right to interstate travel has long been recognized as a fundamental right, grounded upon the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2, of the United States Constitution. Edwards v. People of State of California, 314 U.S. 160, 173, 62 S.Ct. 164 (1941).

    This principle encompasses the right of individuals to “migrate, resettle, find a new job, and start a new life.” Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629, 89 S.Ct 1322, 1329, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969).

    Edwards, Shapiro, and their progeny were concerned with the constitutionality of state statutes designed to discourage indigent people from relocating to their state of choice.

    The Supreme Court consistently held the statutes to be unconstitutional, reasoning,

    “…[t]he nature of our Federal Union and our constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land, uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.” Id.

    The Court also held that the right of travel is “…a virtually unconditional personal right, guaranteed by the Constitution to us all.” Id. at 643, 89 S.Ct. at 1336.

    For the same reasons that a state cannot prohibit a person from moving to a particular area, it also cannot prohibit a person from moving from a particular area.

    Strict Scrutiny

    Court action that places restrictions on a citizen’s fundamental rights requires application of the strict scrutiny test. Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412 (1981); U.S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, 58 S.Ct. 778 (1938).

    Under strict scrutiny, the state must show that it has a compelling purpose for denying the fundamental right and that the remedy chosen is narrowly tailored to meet the stated purpose. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 634, 89 S.Ct. at 1331.

    Requiring a citizen to live in a specific locale, thereby restricting his or her fundamental right of travel, must be based on compelling state concerns. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990).

    I am not an attorney, I am a patriot. The information posted in this venue is just that, it is NOT “LEGAL ADVICE”. It is a The Supreme Law of the Land! The Supreme Law of the Land, the Constitution of the Republic (emphasis added!!) of the United States of America is the final word in all courts period! ESPECIALLY THE LOWER Municipalities…

    God Bless and keep you, and may the road rise to meet you.

  3. stmatthew says:

    RCW 46.25.050
    Commercial driver’s license required — Exceptions, restrictions, reciprocity.

    (1) Drivers of commercial motor vehicles must obtain a commercial driver’s license as required under this chapter. Except when driving under a commercial learner’s permit and a valid driver’s license and accompanied by the holder of a commercial driver’s license valid for the vehicle being driven, no person may drive a commercial motor vehicle unless the person holds and is in immediate possession of a commercial driver’s license and applicable endorsements valid for the vehicle they are driving. However, this requirement does not apply to any person:

    (a) Who is the operator of a farm vehicle, and the vehicle is:

    (i) Controlled and operated by a farmer;

    (ii) Used to transport either agricultural products, which in this section include Christmas trees and wood products harvested from private tree farms and transported by vehicles weighing no more than forty thousand pounds licensed gross vehicle weight, farm machinery, farm supplies, animal manure, animal manure compost, or any combination of those materials to or from a farm;

    (iii) Not used in the operations of a common or contract motor carrier; and

    (iv) Used within one hundred fifty miles of the person’s farm; or

    (b) Who is a firefighter or law enforcement officer operating emergency equipment, and:

    (i) The firefighter or law enforcement officer has successfully completed a driver training course approved by the director; and

    (ii) The firefighter or law enforcement officer carries a certificate attesting to the successful completion of the approved training course; or

    (c) Who is operating a recreational vehicle for noncommercial purposes. As used in this section, “recreational vehicle” includes a vehicle towing a horse trailer for a noncommercial purpose; or

    (d) Who is operating a commercial motor vehicle for military purposes. This exception is applicable to active duty military personnel; members of the military reserves; members of the national guard on active duty, including personnel on full-time national guard duty, personnel on part-time national guard training, and national guard military technicians (civilians who are required to wear military uniforms); and active duty United States coast guard personnel. This exception is not applicable to United States reserve technicians.

    (2) No person may drive a commercial motor vehicle while his or her driving privilege is suspended, revoked, or canceled, while subject to disqualification, or in violation of an out-of-service order. Violations of this subsection shall be punished in the same way as violations of RCW 46.20.342(1).

    (3) The department must, to the extent possible, enter into reciprocity agreements with adjoining states to allow the waivers described in subsection (1) of this section to apply to drivers holding commercial driver’s licenses from those adjoining states.

    [2013 c 224 § 4; 2011 c 142 § 1; 2006 c 327 § 3; 1995 c 393 § 1; 1990 c 56 § 1; 1989 c 178 § 7.]

    Effective date — 2013 c 224: See note following RCW 46.01.130.

    **Contradictory to the following, which appears, in contrast to the preceding RCW citation, to be intentionally confusing, and certainly confliciting…

    RCWs > Title 46 > Chapter 46.20 > Section 46.20.001

    Beginning of Chapter <> 46.20.005

    RCW 46.20.001
    License required — Rights and restriction.

    (1) No person may drive a motor vehicle upon a highway in this state without first obtaining a valid driver’s license issued to Washington residents under this chapter. The only exceptions to this requirement are those expressly allowed by RCW 46.20.025.

    (2) A person licensed as a driver under this chapter:

    (a) May exercise the privilege upon all highways in this state;

    (b) May not be required by a political subdivision to obtain any other license to exercise the privilege; and

    (c) May not have more than one valid driver’s license at any time.

    [1999 c 6 § 3.]

    Intent — 1999 c 6: See note following RCW 46.04.168.

    RCWs > Title 46 > Chapter 46.20 > Section 46.20.025

    46.20.024 <> 46.20.027

    RCW 46.20.025

    The following persons may operate a motor vehicle on a Washington highway without a valid Washington driver’s license:

    (1) A member of the United States Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard, or in the service of the National Guard of this state or any other state, if licensed by the military to operate an official motor vehicle in such service;

    (2) A nonresident driver who is at least:

    (a) Sixteen years of age and has immediate possession of a valid driver’s license issued to the driver by his or her home state; or

    (b) Fifteen years of age with:

    (i) A valid instruction permit issued to the driver by his or her home state; and

    (ii) A licensed driver who has had at least five years of driving experience occupying a seat beside the driver; or

    (c) Sixteen years of age and has immediate possession of a valid driver’s license issued to the driver by his or her home country. A nonresident driver may operate a motor vehicle in this state under this subsection (2)(c) for up to one year;

    (3) Any person operating special highway construction equipment as defined in RCW 46.04.551;

    (4) Any person while driving or operating any farm tractor or implement of husbandry that is only incidentally operated or moved over a highway; or

    (5) An operator of a locomotive upon rails, including a railroad crossing over a public highway. A locomotive operator is not required to display a driver’s license to any law enforcement officer in connection with the operation of a locomotive or train within this state.

    [2010 c 161 § 1113; 1999 c 6 § 6; 1993 c 148 § 1; 1979 c 75 § 1; 1965 ex.s. c 121 § 3.]

    Effective date — Intent — Legislation to reconcile chapter 161, Laws of 2010 and other amendments made during the 2010 legislative session — 2010 c 161: See notes following RCW 46.04.013.
    Intent — 1999 c 6: See note following RCW 46.04.168.

    Reconcile this.

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  5. Fred says:

    A “driver” according to many legal sources, is “one employed” to operate a vehicle. To “operate a motor vehicle” is to use a vehicle in business for profit (hauling freight for hire, carrying fare-paying passengers).
    We do NOT have a right to use the public highway as a place of business. We do NOT have a right to use public property for private gain. Thus we do NOT have a right to “drive.”

    The statutory term for the nonbusiness use of an automobile is “use.” We DO have the right to “use” a nonbusiness automobile on the public highways. Statutes don’t talk much about this because statutes are all concerned with prohibitions; statutes talk about what we may not do. In a free country, that which is not forbidden is permitted; statutes do the forbidding. Thus there is hardly any statutory language about things that we have a right to do.

    In Oregon, ORS 801.305(1) states that: “Highway” means every public way, road, street, thoroughfare and place, including bridges, viaducts and other structures within the boundaries of this state, open, used or intended for use of the general public for vehicles or vehicular traffic as a matter of right.


    • Fred:
      The following statutes I am adding to this comment are Oregon’s statutes that provide proof that driving as what it is; a privilege not a right as you erroneously claim and I copied and pasted from OregonLaws.org.

      § 801.050¹
      Privilege of motorist to use highways

      Subject to compliance with the motor vehicle law of this state, owners and operators of motor vehicles are granted the privilege of using the highways of this state. [1983 c.338 §10; 1985 c.16 §8]

      § 801.255¹
      Driving privilege

      Driving privilege means the grant of authority by a jurisdiction to a person that allows that person to drive a vehicle on highways within that jurisdiction. Driving privileges grant authority to a person not to a vehicle. The driving privilege includes any such grant of authority whether or not documents are issued as evidence of the authority. In this state, driving privileges may be granted under:
      (1) A license as defined under ORS 801.207 (Commercial driver license) and 801.245 (Driver license).
      (2) Driver permits as described in ORS 801.250 (Driver permit).
      (3) The driving privileges established under ORS 807.020 (Exemptions from requirement to have Oregon license or permit).
      (4) Any endorsement of a license or driver permit or limitations on a license or driver permit that allows a person to operate a motor vehicle. [1983 c.338 §42; 1989 c.636 §8; 2003 c.14 §458]

      § 801.370¹

      Operation means any operation, towing, pushing, movement or otherwise propelling. [1983 c.338 §66]

      § 801.245¹
      Driver license

      Driver license or license may have any or all of the meanings provided for the terms under this section as required or appropriate under the section referring to the term. The term driver license may be used interchangeably with license and either term may be used in any or all of the following ways:
      (1) It may refer to a document issued by this state or any other jurisdiction as evidence of a grant of driving privileges.
      (2) It may refer to general driving privileges granted by this state or another jurisdiction. [1983 c.338 §54; 1985 c.182 §1; 1985 c.608 §2]


      § 801.207¹
      Commercial driver license

      Commercial driver license means a driver license issued by this state or any other jurisdiction that authorizes its holder to drive a commercial motor vehicle if the holder also has any necessary endorsements to the license. [1989 c.636 §3; 2003 c.14 §457]


      While your work of legal fiction is a well-crafted story, the plot of your story falls apart when I remove two plot strings. What plot strings I speak of is first your use of equivocation between the verb “use” and the noun “use” and second is your use of fabricated legal phrases and definitions.

      TriXteR Phillips

    • Jo says:

      Driving is a PRIVILEGE. That was the opinion ruled by the U.S. Supreme Court some time ago. One may “use” public roads for travel via motor vehicle in the U.S.A. if one has obtained a driving operator’s license issued by the department of transportation. If one wants to drive without an operator’s license, well, then take personal responsibility for the consequences. Usually in the form of a citation and or loss of driving privileges.

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  8. Bree Hood says:

    Driving is Not a privilege, the “right to travel” though not actually in the constitution has been supported by case law and is indeed a right of the free people of this country. The Supreme Court notes in Saenz v Roe, 98-97 (1999), the Constitution does not contain the word “travel” in any context however the presumed right to travel, however, is firmly established in U.S. law and precedent. In U.S. v Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966), the Court noted, “It is a right that has been firmly established and repeatedly recognized.” In fact, in Shapiro v Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), Justice Stewart noted in a concurring opinion that “it is a right broadly assertable against private interference as well as governmental action. Like the right of association, … it is a virtually unconditional personal right, guaranteed by the Constitution to us all.”

    If we continue to further misconceptions about our rights we are essentially giving those rights away to people who have shown they will only abuse any power they manage to steal from us, can anyone say Patriot act?

    Just look under “the right to travel” section to see my source info.


    • What is the fastest way to piss off a cop and end up in cuffs?

      Answer, tell them it is your right to drive in no uncertain terms.

      Thank you for the comment Bree.

      Driving is a privilege and while the author of the text you qoute believes driving is a privilege it is not a privilege.

      I do appreciate the notion of Roger Roots that driving without a license is the “the orphaned right”, however, this bill is about cannabis legalization and not about establishing driving as a privilege. Again, I am sure there is room for citizens of this nation to argue that it is a “right” to drive but the campaign to change those laws is a separate campaign.

      In addition, the point of this article is to draw a clearly enumerate current state law that dictates driving is a privilege and therefore not the equal to or comparable to the human right to consume cannabis and stay out of jail. Far too often No on I-502 overstates the importance of the driving privilege to frame it as a right, this is false, and if I could prove intent a lie, to say the least.
      The problem I see with No on I-502 when it comes to this issue is that if you as an individual or a group collectively want to start an Initiative together that make driving a right in the state of Washington and leave this pet peeve against driving currently being a privilege when it should be a right out of cannabis legalization. It does neither cause any good and hampers cannabis legalization efforts worldwide.
      Unless No on I-502 only cares about their own agendas then it would make sense to confound the issue with a non-issue.

      Here are some relevent information.

      Mann Act

      The 1910 Mann Act (White-Slave Traffic Act) among other things banned the interstate transport of females for otherwise undefined “immoral purposes”, which were taken to include consensual extramarital sex. This act was used, in addition to less controversial cases, to allow federal prosecution of unmarried couples who had for some reason come to the attention of the authorities; interracial couples (e.g. boxer Jack Johnson) and people with left-wing views (e.g. Charlie Chaplin) were prosecuted. The Act remains in force as of 2010, but with added safeguards against abuse.
      The U.S. Supreme Court also dealt with the right to travel in the case of Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999). In that case, Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the majority, held that the United States Constitution protected three separate aspects of the right to travel among the states: the right to enter one state and leave another, the right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than a hostile stranger (protected by the “privileges and immunities” clause in Article IV, § 2), and (for those who become permanent residents of a state) the right to be treated equally to native born citizens (this is protected by the 14th Amendment’s Citizenship Clause).

      The Court’s establishment of a strong constitutional right to freedom of movement has also had far-reaching and unintended effects. For example, the Supreme Court overturned state prohibitions on welfare payments to individuals who had not resided within the jurisdiction for at least one year as an impermissible burden on the right to travel (Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)). The Court has also struck down one-year residency requirements for voting in state elections (Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972)), one-year waiting periods before receiving state-provided medical care (Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974)), civil service preferences for state veterans (Attorney Gen. of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986)), but upheld higher fishing and hunting license fees for out-of-state residents (Baldwin v. Fish and Game Commission of Montana, 436 U.S. 371 (1978)).[11][12][13]

      Current US Code addresses air travel specifically. In 49 U.S.C. § 40103, “Sovereignty and use of airspace”, the Code specifies that “A citizen of the United States has a public right of transit through the navigable airspace.”

      A strong right to freedom of movement may yet have even farther-reaching implications. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that freedom of movement is closely related to freedom of association and to freedom of expression. Strong constitutional protection for the right to travel may have significant implications for state attempts to limit abortion rights, ban or refuse to recognize same-sex marriage, and enact anti-crime or consumer protection laws. It may even undermine current Court-fashioned concepts of federalism.[14][15][16][17][18]

      For much of American history, the right to travel included the right to travel by the vehicle of one’s choice, and courts occasionally struck down regional regulations that required licenses or government permission to travel on public roadways. With the advent of the automobile, however, courts began upholding laws and regulations requiring licenses to operate vehicles on roadways. Constitutional scholar Roger Roots has referred to the forgotten right to travel without license as “the orphaned right.”[19]

      • anon says:

        You forgot to j Claude the Oregon statutes that refer to recreation automobiles and family cars as being exempt from licenses. Not to mention they can only force you to follow these regulations if your STRAW MAN is still attached and you are still and employee of the UNITED STATES CORPORATION

        • anon says:


        • I had to familiarize myself with the discussion and while I am not sure what specifically you mean by “family cars” and “recreational [vehicles]” let alone how your baseless (none sourced) claim that these vehicle types are “exemption from licenses” refutes the fact that driving is a privilege in America, all Fifty States, and, moreover and specifically, in Oregon, the State who’s laws are currently in question. So, no, I did not forget to include that, as I still see it, irrelevant information.

          However, since it is your rebuttal to my already lengthy argument, it is you dear Anon that forgot to include that information. As well, you forgot to put forward an argument and instead stated assertions and attempted waxing poetically.

          If you care to source your “information” and formulate an argument that I can properly address, please feel free to do just that.

          In the mean time I will leave you with:

          § 807.350¹
          Cancellation of privileges
          • issuance of more limited license or permit

          (1) The Department of Transportation, at any time, may cancel the driving privileges or part of the driving privileges granted any person under any class of license or under any endorsement or any driver permit if the department determines that the person no longer meets the qualifications or requirements for the license, endorsement or permit.

          (2)(a) The department may immediately cancel the driving privileges granted any person under any class of license or under any endorsement or any driver permit if the person is unable to reestablish eligibility under ORS 807.340 (Reestablishment of eligibility) and the department determines that:
          (A) The person is no longer able to safely operate a motor vehicle; and
          (B) The person may endanger people or property if the persons driving privileges are not immediately canceled.
          (b) A cancellation under this subsection is subject to a post-imposition hearing under ORS 809.440 (Hearing and administrative review procedures).

          (3) Upon cancellation under this section, a person whose driving privileges are canceled shall surrender to the department any license or driver permit issued for the driving privileges. Failure to comply with this subsection is subject to penalty as provided under ORS 809.500 (Failure to return suspended, revoked or canceled license).

          (4) If the department cancels driving privileges under this section, the department may provide for the issuance of a license, driver permit or license with endorsement or limitations granting driving privileges for which the person does qualify or meet the requirements. The department may provide for the waiver of all or part of the fees relating to the issuance of a license or driver permit when the department issues a driver permit or license under this subsection, as the department determines equitable.

          (5) A person whose driving privileges are canceled under this section may regain the canceled driving privileges only by reapplying for the privileges and establishing eligibility and qualification for the driving privileges as provided by law. [1985 c.608 §33; 2003 c.14 §484; 2011 c.355 §31]


          • Anonymouse says:

            What TRIXTER phillips fails to mention, in all of his verbose transcriptional arguments, is that once you surrender (ie “get licensed in (fill in state here)” your right, as protected under the constitution, and it’s amendments, you must then succumb to punishable offenses to the laws of that license. If you receive no licensure from ( fill in state here), then ” the right of locomotion” (i.e driving) is a Constitutionally Protected Right!!! These cases uphold my argument; ( Chicago Motor Coach v. Chicago 169 NE 22 “… in the ordinary course of business or pleasure” ), ( Kent v. Dulles 357 U.S. 116, 125 “The right to travel…without DUE PROCESS of law under 5th Amendment.”), ( Thompson v. Smith 154 SE 579 ” …,either by carriage or automobile, is not a mere privilege which a city may prohibit or permit at will, but a COMMON RIGHT…”) ,thus ( Schactman v. Dulles 96 App. D.C.287, 293 ” Undoubtedly the right of locomotion…according to INCLINATION, is an attribute of PERSONAL LIBERTY, and the right , ordinarily, of free transport from or through the territory of ANY STATE is a right secured by the 14th Amendment and by OTHER provisions of the Constitution” ), and any rights protected under the Constitution, and It’s Amendments, in the ( Miller v. U.S. 230 F 2d. 486, 489 “…CLAIM and EXERCISE of Constitutional right cannot be converted into a crime…”, and since ( Hertado v. California 110 U.S. 516 ” …the State cannot diminish rights of the people…” ), ( Davis v. Wechsler 263 U.S. 22, 24 “…the assertion of Federal Rights, when PLAINLY and REASONABLY made, is NOT to be defeated under the name of local practice.”) Thus, (Miranda v. Arizona 384 U.S. 436, 491 “…where rights SECURED by the Constitution are INVOLVED, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them.” ) nor, ( Sherar v. Cullen 481 F. 945 “…there can be NO SANCTION or PENALTY IMPOSED upon one because of this exercise of Constitutional Rights.”).
            I am no lawyer, and I never saw TRIXTER give any credentials, so…..do the research your self people, even ask a lawyers advice, before you go spouting off in the Face of the Law. Also remember, officers are people too. Treat them with the respect you want to be treated with. These Constitutional Laws were not created and ruled upon to be used as some sort of scapegoat for inappropriate behaviOUR. A State issued Liscense, ” in the law of contracts, is a permission, accorded by a competent authority (this is a questionable statement when applied to State run bureaucracies and agencies), conferring the right to do some act which without such authorization would be illegal, or would be a trespass or tort.” (as defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, 2nd Ed., c. 1910), thus this license, or ” contract’, that has an expiration date which renders the licensure, or contractual agreement null and void in a court of law, is IN FACT super-ceded by the Constitutional Laws of the United States. Once your License expires you may then be protected under these Constitutional Laws.
            Since, “…under our system government upon the individuality and intelligence of the citizen, the STATE DOES NOT CLAIM TO CONTROL HIM/ HER, except as his/her conduct to others, leaving HIM/ HER SOLE JUDGE as to all that affects himself/ herself ” (Mugler v. Kansas 123 U.S. 623, 659 – 60), the States DO NOT have a RIGHT to require a license to traverse any Right of Way that is public, with in their respective border, to a PROPERLY DECLARED Legal Sovereign. (see http://www.thecountyguard.org/right-2-drive-handout.html) I personally have no affiliation, or know of the veracity, of this document. I am currently researching and obtaining legal advice on the contents and ramifications of becoming a declared legal Sovereign.
            Once again, do the research yourself. Seek REAL legal advice on matters of such importance, don’t just take annonymous, or “self proclaimed” Trixter”s, who I dubiously suspect works for what-ever state he is Regurgitating laws about in some form of un-Constitutional motor vehicle taxation. A GOD GIVEN RIGHT cannot be taxed, but a licensed ” privelege” can. Do your homework, people.

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